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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
TIMOTHY and MILDRED LAIRBY, 
Defendants-Appellants.: 
Case No. 18998 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Timothy Lairby, was charged with one 
count of rape, a first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-402 (1953), as amended; two counts of forcible sexual 
abuse, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. 76-5-404 
(1953), as amended; and two counts of forcible sodomy, a first 
degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. 76-5-403 (1953), as 
amended. 
Appellant, Mildred Lairhy, was charged with one 
count of forcible sexual abuse, a third degree felony, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After a jury trial on October 27, 28, 29 and 
November 1, 1982 in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, 
presiding, Timothy Lairby was found guilty of rape, both 
counts of forcible sexual abuse, and one count of forcible 
sodomy. He was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a term 
of five years to life for rape, two indeterminate terms not to 
exceed five years for forcible sexual abuse, and a term of 
five years to life for forcible sodomy -- the sentences to run 
concurrently. Mildred Lairby was found guilty as charged and 
placed on probation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgements and sentences of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 14, 1981, appellant Mildred R. Lairby was 
arrested for sexual abuse of her four-year-old step-daughter, 
Virginia M. Lairby ("Lisa") (R. 6). The victimization 
occurred on April 18, 1981. Subsequent investigation by 
Officer Guy Blunck of the Salt Lake City Police Department 
resulted in the arrest of appellant Timothy M. Lairby on July 
22, 1981, for sex crimes involving both his four-year old 
natural daughter, Virginia Lairby, and his eight-year-old 
step-daughter, Carri A. Long. Carri is Mildred Lairby's 
natural daughter. 
Wanda Lairby, Virginia Lairby's natural mother, was 
divorced from Timothy Lairby on December 10, 1980. Wanda 
retained temporary custody of their children and appellant 
Timothy Lairby was granted visitation rights each Saturday 
from noon to six p.m. and from Friday at six p.m. until Sunday 
at six p.m. on the third weekend of each month (R. 373). It 
was during these weekend visits at appellants' home that the 
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sexual abuse of Virginia occurred. Carri Long was residing 
with Mildred and Timothy when she was victimized. 
At her own home following her visit with her father 
on April 19, 1981, Virginia complained to Wanda Lairby that 
her "privates" hurt (R. 178). Virginia testified that her 
priv&tes began to hurt after she slipped and fell onto her 
bottom in the tub while taking a bath and that the pain 
reminded her of what Mildred had done to her during Virginia's 
most recent visit (R. 210, 270). Virginia repeatedly 
testified that Mildred Lairby stuck a fork in her privates (R. 
166, 179, 217, 221, 229, 248, 277) in the bathroom of Timothy 
and Mildred's home (R. 164, 178, 217) on Easter 1981 (R. 166). 
Although there is some confusion as to which end of the fork 
Mildred used, (R. 223, 224), Virginia was emphatic on both 
direct and cross-examination that Mildred used a fork (R. 166, 
179, 217, 221, 229, 248, 277). Virginia further testified 
that the fork caused her to bleed so that she had to wash the 
blood out of her panties (R. 167, 168, 275) and that Mildred 
put an ice cube on her privates to stop the bleeding (R. 168), 
telling her that she would give her candy to forget the 
incident (R. 169). Moreover, Virginia stated that Timothy 
Lairby was present on this occasion and that he helped Mildred 
hurt her (R. 154, 215, 217, 248). 
Wanda Lairby testified that when Virginia told her 
of incident on April 19th she wanted to take Virginia to 
the hospital for an examination, but was unable to do so until 
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April 20th as she lackec'l transportation (R. 177, 378, 189, 
401) • Dr. Elmo Grewell, the examining physician on April 
20th, testified that redness existed around the mucous 
membrane of Virginia's vagina, but he was unable to 
categorically state that molestation had taken place (R. 124). 
With regard to Timothy Lairby, Virginia testified 
generally that Timothy hurt her several times (R. 161). 
Virginia was unable to precisely state the various dates that 
he hurt her, but she referred to dates shortly before Easter 
1981 (R. 166). Notwithstanding her inability to cite specific 
dates, Virginia had seen appellant's penis (R. 158), she knew 
its anatomical location (R. 158), she drew it for defense 
counsel ( R. 202), she remembered appellant's penis as being 
hard when it touched her (R. 169), and she vividly recalled 
that she was hurt (and criec'l) when appellant's penis touched 
inside her vagina (R. 161, 268, 274). Furthermore, Virginia 
made graphic references to the seminal emission from 
appellant's penis, describing it as a yellow-brown mix (R. 
265) and stating that appellant's penis had "puked" all over 
her privates so that she had to wash it off herself (R. 171). 
Virginia also recounted another episode when Timothy 
Lairby touched her privates with his finger, which she stated, 
"felt very awful" (R. 15R, 159, 205). Virginia tol<l of yet 
another incident when Timothy Lairby had sucke<l her privates 
in the bathroom of his residence (R. 177, 17q, 269). 
Dr. William Palmer, a member of the Child Protection 
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Team of the of Utah and Primary Children's Medical 
Center, examined Virginia in May of 1981 (R. 321), and it was 
his expert opinion that she was a victim of sexual abuse (R. 
335). The other victim in the instant case, Carri A. Lang, 
also testified that she was sexually abused by Timothy Lairby. 
As previously mentioned, Carri is the natural daughter of 
Mildred Lairby and was living with appellants when she was 
victimized (R. 462). 
Carri testified that she too had seen appellant's 
penis (R. 466), on one occasion when Virginia was in the room 
(R. 465), and on another when she observed appellant hold his 
penis with his fist (R. 469, 520-521). She also testified 
that on the weekend following her March 15th birthday, 
appellant laid her on a bed, pulled off her pants and 
underwear, exposed himself to her, and then touched her vagina 
(R. 474-478). Moreover, Carri testified that two weeks after 
her birthday, appellant removed her clothes again and 
proceeded to touch the inside of her vagina with a plastic 
object (R. 482-483). The transcript indicates that Carri was 
visibly upset on the stand and at one point during the 
proceedings visibly wept when counsel asked if she had seen 
Timothy Lairby's privates (R. 517). 
Timothy Lairby was denied further visitation rights 
after April 20, 1981 and subsequent to his arrest on July 22, 
1981, Carri and Virginia were placed in foster care (R. 533). 
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POINT I 
APPELLANTS HAVE WAIVED ANY OBJECTIONS TO 
THE LEGALITY OF THEIR ARRESTS. 
Appellants contend that there was no probable cause 
for their arrests, as evidenced by the inadequacies in the 
informations and the warrants issued for their arrests. 
However, it is generally held that a defendant's failure to 
object to the legality of his arrest prior to trial 
constitutes a waiver of that issue. See, e.g. United States 
v. Grote, 532 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
819, reh. denied., 454 u.s. 1129 (1981); Massey v. People, 179 
Colo. 167, 498 P.2d 953 (1972); Fisher v. State, Okl. Cr., 483 
P.2d 1162 (1971); State v. Barton, 79 N.M. 70, 439 P.2d 719 
(1968). This waiver rule should apply to appellants, who made 
no obejection prior to (or even during) trial to the legality 
of their arrests. This Court should accordingly refuse to 
consider the issue on appeal. such a ruling would be 
cons is tent with procedural rules already in place which 
require timely objections to defects in indictments and 
informations, and to the adm iss ib i 1 i ty of evidence seized 
incident to an allegedly unlawful arrest. See Rule 12(b), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; State v. Hall, Utah, 671 
P.2d 201, 202; State v. Lesley, Utah, P. 2d , Slip Opin. 
No. 18038, filed September 14, 1983. 
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POINT II 
BECAUSE APPELLANTS DID NOT OBJECT, EITHER 
BEFORE OR DURING TRIAL, TO ANY ALLEGED 
DEFECTS IN THE INFORMATIONS FILED AGAINST 
THEM, THEY ARE PRECLUDED FROM RAISING THAT 
ISSUE ON APPEAL. ALTERNATIVELY, THOSE 
INFORMATIONS SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE LAW. 
Appellants contend that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction because the informations filed against them were 
mistitled and not signed by a prosecuting attorney. Under 
Rule 12(b)(l) and (d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,l a 
defendant waives any objections to defects in an information 
unless he objects to the information either before or during 
trial. State v. Hall, Utah, 671 P.2d 201 (1983). Because 
appellants failed to comply with Rule 12(b)(l), they are 
precluded from raising the issue of defective informations on 
appeal. Moreover, the informations filed against appellants 
met all the legal requirements recently outlined by this Court 
in State, ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, Utah, 646 P.2d 727 (1982). 
POINT III 
BECAUSE APPELLANTS HAVE NOT PROVIDED THIS 
COURT WITH AN ADEQUATE RECORD OF THEIR 
PRELIMINARY HEARINGS, THIS COURT CANNOT 
RULE ON APPELLANTS' ALLEGATIONS OF ERR:>R 
AT THOSE HEARINGS. 
Appellants make several allegations of prejudicial 
error at their preliminary hearings. To support these 
1 Utah Code Ann. 77-35-12(b){l) and (d) (1953) 
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allegations, appellants refer to uncertified, partial 
transcripts of their preliminary hearings (see attachment to 
Appellants' Brief after p. 77). On the title pages of the 
transcripts appellants state that the master tapes of those 
hearings have been erased by the Fifth Circuit Court as part 
of their normal procedure. 
( 1982): 
As noted in State v. Jones, Utah, 657 P.2d 1263 
The burden of showing error is on the 
party who seeks to upset the judgment. In 
the absence of record evidence to the 
contrary, we assume regularity in the 
proceedings below, and affirm the 
judgment. (Citations omitted.) 
Id. at 1267. The rationale for this position is given in 
State v. Wulffenstein, Utah, 657 P.2d 289 (1982): 
When a defendant predicates error to this 
Court, he has the duty and responsibility 
of supporting such allegation by an 
adequate record. Absent that record, 
defendant's assignment of error stands as 
a unilateral allegation which the review 
court has no power to determine. This 
Court simply cannot rule on a question 
which depends for its existence upon 
alleged facts unsupported by the record. 
See State v. Jones (1982), 657 P.2d 1263, 
and cases cited therein. See also McBride 
v. State , Alaska, 368 P.2d 925, 929 
(1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 811, 83 
s.ct. 1702, lo L. Ed. 2d 1035 (1963). 
Id. at 293. See also State v. Mitchell, Utah, 671 P.2d 213 
(1983). The preliminary hearing transcripts provided by 
appellants simply are not an adequate record to support their 
allegations of error, even in the face of appellants' 
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unsubstantiated claim that the master tapes of their 
preliminary hearings have been destroyed. Accordingly, 
appellants' assignments of error cannot be considered by this 
Court. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANTS WERE NOT DENIED THE RIGHT TO A 
SPEEDY TRIAL, NOR WAS TIMOTHY LAIRBY'S 
PRELIMINARY HEARING UNLAWFULLY DELAYED. 
Appellants claim that they were denied their 
constitutional right to a speedy trial due to the fifteen to 
seventeen month delay between the dates of their arrests and 
their trial. They argue that this delay resulted in the 
imposition of punishment before trial and was improperly used 
by the prosecution to coach certain child witnesses who would 
eventually testify at trial. 
The Utah and United States Constitutions guarantee 
criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. 
amend. VI; Utah Const. art. 12. The right is also 
guaranteed by Utah Code Ann.§ 77-l-6(f) (1953). As noted by 
this Court in State v. Knill, Utah, 656 P.2d 1026 (1982): 
Whether the federal right [to a speedy 
trial] as been violated is determined by 
balancing the "[l]ength of delay, the 
reason for the delay, the defendant's 
assertion of his right, and prejudice to 
the defendant." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 
514,530, 92 s.ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed. 2d 
101 (1972). Similar considerations also 
apply under the Utah Constitution. State 
v. Velasquez, Utah, 641 P.2d 115, 116 
(1982); State v. Hafen, Utah, 593 P.2d 
538, 541 (1979); State v. Giles, Utah, 576 
P.2d 876, 879 (1978). 
Id. at 1029. 
-9-
Because neither appellant asserted his to a speedy trial 
in the lower court, their claim that they were denied that 
right is foreclosed from consideration by this Court. See 
State v. Sparks, Utah, P.2d , Slip Opin. No. 18780 P.3, 
filed October 14, 1983. 
Even if appellants had not waived this issue, they 
were not harmed by the delays in bringing their cases to trial 
and, therefore, cannot claim error. The purposes behind 
statutes protecting the constitutional right to a speedy trial 
are to prevent an accused from being held in custody for 
unreasonable periods of time absent a determination of guilt 
by an impartial tribunal and to prevent law enforcement 
officials from holding undisposed charges over the head of a 
prisoner. State v. Weddle, 29 Utah 2d 145, 147, 506 P.2d 67, 
68 (1973); State v. Velasquez, Utah, 641 P.2d 115, 116 (1982). 
These abuses are manifested only when a defendant is in 
custody. In the instant case, both appellants were granted 
pretrial release, and thus were not harmed by the delay in 
that way. 
Furthermore, this court in Velasquez said that a 
defendant who acts to delay the disposition of pending charges 
has indicated "his willingness to temporarily waive [the] 
protection [of the constitutional right to a speedy trial]." 
In this situation, •the purpose behind the statute .•• no 
longer exists." 641 P.2d at 116. The record indicates that 
every continuation of appellants' trial dates was based either 
on the state's motion as stipulated to by appellants, or on a 
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defense motion (see R. 32, 13, 34, 37, 43, 53-55, 62, 72, 
78).2 It is well-settled that: 
The granting of a continuance of a case is 
a matter resting in the sound discretion 
of the trial judge, and that discretion 
will not be interfered with on appeal 
except where the court clearly abused its 
discretion in the matter. Thompson v. 
United States, 372 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 
1957); United States v. Green, 497 F.2d 
1068 (7th Cir. 1974). 
State v. Moosman, Utah, 542 P.2d 1093, 1094 (1975). Under 
these circumstances, appellants cannot now claim that they 
were denied a speedy trial. 
Timothy Lairby makes the additional argument that 
the delay between his initial appearance in the circuit court 
and his preliminary hearing was unreasonable and without good 
cause. The record indicates that an information was filed and 
an arrest warrant issued against him on July 20, 1981 (R. 4). 
He was arrested on July 22, 1981 (R. 3). A preliminary 
hearing was scheduled in circuit court for July 30, 1981 
(within the ten day period required by Utah Code Ann. 
77-35-7(c} for defendants in custody); 
stipulation of both parties, the court adjourned and the 
hearing was continued to September 17, 1981 (R. 4). According 
to his brief, Mr. Lairby arranged bond after thirteen days in 
2 One except ion appears in the record. In Mildred La irby' s 
case, the court, on its own motion, reset her trial date 
from September 28, 1981 to February 9, 1982 (see R. 8, 
20-21). However, there is nothing to indicate that this 
was an unreasonable or prejudicial delay, 
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custody (see Appellants' Brief at p. 21). At that point the 
thirty day and extended time period provisions of 77-35-7(c) 
became operative. The record indicates the date for 
preliminary hearing was continued until January 7, 1982 by 
court order based on stipulation of both parties (R. 5). 
There is nothing to indicate that the court's further 
continuances of the preliminary hearing date to March 11, 1982 
were an abuse of discretion or prejudicial to Mr. Lairby. 
Moreover, it does not appear that Mr. Lairby made any 
objection to the district court concerning the alleged 
unreasonable delay by the circuit court in holding a 
preliminary hearing. 
POINT V 
APPELLANTS' , DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE NOT 
VIOLATED WHEN THE TRIAL COURT DENIED A 
DEFENSE MOTION TO COMPEL THE PRETRIAL 
DEPOSITION OF TWO POTENTIAL PROSECUTION 
WITNESSES. 
Appellants contend that it was improper for the 
trial court to deny a defense motion to compel the deposition 
of two of the prosecution's potential witnesses, Carri and 
Traci Long, prior to trial (R. 26-36, 39). This contention is 
based on the premise that the potential witnesses they desired 
to depose were about to le ave the state and thus the is sue 
would fall within the ambit of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-35-14(h)(l953), as amended, which reads: 
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Whenever a material witness is about to 
leave the state, or is so ill or infirm as 
to afford reasonable grounds for believing 
that he will be unable to attend a trial 
or hearing, either party may, upon notice 
to the other, apply to the court for an 
order that the witness be examined 
conditionally by deposition. Attendance 
of the witness at the deposition may be 
compelled by subpoena. The defendant 
shall be present at the deposition and the 
court shall make whatever order is 
necessary to effect such attendance. 
Although appellants assert that the witness were about to 
leave the state, they provide no factual basis for that 
assertion (See Appellants' Brief at p. 28), Moreover, while 
appellants suggest in hindsight that this was the purpose of 
the motion to compel, the motion itself makes no mention of 
this fact (See R. 26). Quite simply, the trial court could 
not be expected to apply 77-35-14(h), since it had not been 
advised at the time the motion was presented that the 
witnesses were about to le ave the state. 
Furthermore, criminal defendants do not enjoy an 
absolute right to depose prospective prosecution witnesses. 
In the absence of a state statute to the contrary, it is 
generally held that a person accused of a crime in a state 
court is not entitled as a matter of right to take the 
depositions of prospective witnesses before trial. See, e.g., 
State v. Ashley, Fla. App., 393 So. 2d 1168 (1981); People v. 
Bowen, 22 Cal. App. 2d 267, 99 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1971); State v. 
Polsky, 82 N.M. 377, 482 P.2d 241, cert. denied 404 U.S. 1015 
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( 1971), This Court has taken a lPss restrictive approach anrl 
has given the trial court the Jiscretion to grant the 
deposition of prospective witnesses. See State v. Sims, 3n 
Utah 2d 257, 517 P.2d 1315 (1974). 
Although this Court has not arldresserl the 
constitutionality of this discretionary deposition process, 
many courts have held that the denial of a motion to compel a 
deposition does not violate a defendant's Fourteenth Amenrlment 
due process rights. People v. Municipal Court for Pasadena 
Judicial Dist., 143 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1978); Kardy v. Shook, 237 
Md. 524, 207 A.2d 83 (1965); Dixon v. State, 27 Md. App. 443, 
340 A.2d 396 (1975); State v. Tate, 47 N.J. 352, 221 A.2d 12 
( 19 66). Nor is a de fe nda nt' s right to compulsory process 
violated because he is not allowed to depose prospective 
prosecution witnesses. People v. Bowen, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 506. 
The common rationale in dismissing these constitutional 
challenges is that a defendant will be able to confront the 
witnesses at trial and if the prosecution ultimately chooses 
not to call a particular witness, a defendant certainly has 
the right to call that witness in his own behalf. 
When appellants discovered that the prosecution was 
not going to call Traci Long, they could have called her as 
their own witness. If she was not in Utah, it was appellants' 
responsibility to use the Uniform Act to compel the attenrlance 
of witnesses from outside the state. See People v. Carter, 37 
N.Y. 2d 234, 333 N.E. 2d 177 (1975). Both Arizona (where 
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Traci apparently was located) and Utah have adopted the 
Uniform Act. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4092 (1956), as 
amended; Utah Code 77-21-3 (1953). It was appellants' 
failure to implement this procedure, not something the trial 
court or prosecution did or did not do, that resulted in their 
inability to examine any witnesses they felt were necessary to 
their defense. In short, "[t l he duty to present a clefense 
devolves upon the defendant who ••• is responsible for the 
production of witnesses in his behalf." State v. Stewart, 
Ariz. App., 641 P.2d 895, 897 (1982), citing Ferrari v. United 
States, 244 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 
873 (1957). See also State v. Goodman, 207 Kan. 155, 483 P.2d 
1040 (1971). In any event, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying appellants' motion to compel the 
deposition of prospective prosecution witnesses. 
POINT VI 
IT IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION TO HAVE A JURY 
COMPRISED OF EIGBT MEMBERS IN A 
NON-CAPITAL CRIMINAL CASE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-5 (Supp. 1983) reflects the 
mandate of Art. I 10 of the Utah Constitution for an eight 
person jury in a non-capital criminal case. Although 
appellants cite a number of United States Circuit Court of 
Appeals and United States Supreme Court cases in arguing that 
an eight member jury is constitutionally improper, none of the 
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cited cases is applicable. In Williams v. Florida, 399 u.s. 
78 (1969), the United States Supreme Court ruled that a jury 
of six persons in a criminal case is constitutional. By 
analogy, a greater number would also pass constitutional 
muster. Furthermore, in Johnson v. Turner, 429 F.2d 1152 
(10th Cir. 1970), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
specifically ruled, in light of the Williams holding, that the 
eight jurors required under the Utah Constitution was 
constitutional. Appellants therefore have no valid Sixth or 
Fourteenth Amendment claim. 
POINT VII 
APPELLANTS HAVE WAIVED THE ISSUE OF 
MISJOINDER OF OFFENSES AND DEFENDANTS. 
Appellants argue that the single information filed 
against Timothy Lairby improperly joined the several charged 
offenses and that appellants were improperly joined for trial. 
Rule 12(b)(l), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
requires a defendant to make a timely objection to any defects 
in an information. See State v. Hall, Utah, 671 P.2d 2n1 
(1983). Rule 12(b)(4) requires a defendant to make requests 
for severance of charges at least five days prior to trial. 
See also Rule 9(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.3 
3 Utah Code Ann. <ii 77-35-9(d) (1953) 
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Timothy Lairby, who made no objection to the information as 
required by Rule 12(b)(l) and who made no request for 
severance of charges as required by Rule 12(b)(4) and Rule 
9(d), has waived the right to raise the issue of misjoinder of 
offenses on appeal, See State v. Mccumber, Utah, 622 P.2d 
353, 355-356 (1980), interpreting former Utah Code Ann. § 
77-23-10 (1953), as amended, Anrl, because no pretrial motion 
for severance of defendants was made, appellants have waived 
the issue of misjoinder of defendants at trial under Rule 9 
( d) and Ru le 12 ( b) ( 4) and ( d) • 
Finally, appellants knowingly and voluntarily waived 
any due process right to a severance of offenses or rlefendants 
when they st ip ula ted to a jo i nde r of offenses and defendants 
(see R. 89-90). Cf. State v. Mccumber, 622 P.2d at 355-356. 
POINT VIII 
THE ADMISSION OF ONLY A PORTION OF A 
LETTER WRITTEN BY TIMOTHY LAIRBY WAS 
PROPER. 
Appellants contend that the trial court improperly 
admitted selected portions of a letter written by Timothy 
Lairby and argue that the letter should only have been 
admitted in its entirety. The prosecution did not offer the 
portions of the letter to prove the truth of any statement 
under an exception to the hearsay rule, See Rule 63, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Rather, the prosecution offered the 
selected portions under Rule 22, Utah Rules of Evidence, for 
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the purpose of impeaching Timothy Lairby's credibility (R. 
740). See Smith v. State, Md,, 328 A.2d 274, 279 (1974). 
Since the text of the entire letter was apparently unnecessary 
for puposes of impeachment, the trial court excluded the 
inappropriate segments. Later, when defense counsel attempted 
to introduce these remaining segments, the trial court found 
them inadmissible clearly because defense counsel did not show 
how as hearsay they might fall within one of the recognized 
exceptions in Rule 63, or why they shoulil be accepted for any 
non-hearsay use. 
POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
INCLUDE REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS OR IN 
ITS PHRASING OF THE INSTRUCTIONS IT 
ULTIMATELY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
In Point Eighteen of their brief, appellants allege 
that the trial court erred in its handling of the jury 
instructions. Appellants argue either that the court refused 
to include an instruction on an issue they rleemed pertinent or 
that the instruction given by the court was inaccurate, 
incomplete, or patently misleading. Appellants' contentions 
regarding a defendants' theory instruction and a character 
witness instruction fall into the former category, while the 
burden of proof, child competency, rape, and sodomy 
instructions come under the latter category. 
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First, in order for this Court to consider a 
defendant's claim on appeal that the trial court improperly 
refused to give a proposed jury instruction, that proposed 
instruction must be included in the record on appeal. State 
v. Knill, Utah, 656 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1982). The record in the 
instant case does not contain the proposed defendants• theory 
and character witness intructions appellants claim were 
improperly denied. Thus, this Court cannot consider 
appellants' assignments of error in that regard. 
Moreover, a review of the record indicates that at 
no point during the discussion in the trial court about jury 
instructions did appellants make known their desire to have a 
defense theory instruction given. And, with respect to a 
character witness instruction, the record clearly shows that 
the trial court denied that instruction because the precise 
issue of reputation for good character (a requirement of Rule 
63 (28), Utah Rules of Evidence) was not established by the 
testimony given at trial (see R. 784-786). Appellants' 
"character" witnesses testified about their personal feelings 
concerning appellants, not about appellants' reputation for 
good character (see R. 587, 610, 618, 686). Since a character 
witness instruction could not be supported by the evidence, 
the trial court properly denied any such requested 
instruction. See State v. Ricci, Utah, 655 P.2d 690 (1982); 
State v. Minnish, Utah, 560 P.2d 340 (1977). 
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Second, with respect to appellants' assertion that 
the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the State's 
bur<len to prove guilt beyond a reasonable aoubt, Instruction 
No. 15 (R. 116) adequately advised the jury of the requisite 
standara of proof. In a<ldition to the specific "reasonable 
doubt" language in paragraph three of the instruction, when 
read as a whole, the primary purpose of the instruction is to 
insure that the jury clearly understan<ls the concepts of 
"burden" and "reasonable doubt." With an entire instruction 
devoted to this purpose, there is little doubt that the jury 
was aware of the degree of proof required for conviction. 
Third, appellants' contention that Instruction No. 
10 (R. 111) was improper is without merit. Citing State v. 
Wilkerson, Utah, 612 P.2d 362 (1980), they argue that the 
fourth line of that instruction should read "has a moral auty 
to tell the truth • ," rather than just "has a duty to 
tell the truth , ••• " In quoting the standard for 
competency of child witnesses from an earlier case State 
v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965), the Wilkerson 
Court used the phrase "sense of moral duty • • " 612 P. 2d 
at 364 (emphasis added). However, the significance of that 
language is to emphasize that a child witness must recognize 
the obligation to testify truthfully; it was not intended to 
prescribe the exclusive wording to describe that obligation. 
Instruction No. 10, with the word "duty" unmodified by the 
word "moral," adequately informed the jury of the importance 
of a child witness's recognition of his obligation to testify 
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truthfully, and thus was not inconsistent with the standard 
reiterated in Wilkerson. 
Finally, with respect to appellants' argument that 
there was some irregularity in the rape and sodomy 
instructions (Nos. 17 and 18; R. 117 and 118), those 
instructions expressly adhered to the requirements of Utah 
Code Ann. 76-5-402 and (1953), as amended, for 
rape, and of Utah Code Ann. 76-5-403 (1953), as amended, for 
sodomy. Appellants' remaining arguments regarding the jury 
instructions are pure conjecture. 
POINT X 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, MOTION FOR 
ARREST OF JUDGMENT, AND MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL. 
Appellants' contention that the trial court's denial 
of their motion to dismiss was a denial of due process is 
based entirely on their view that the evidence was not 
sufficient to support a conviction of any of the offenses with 
which they were charged. As shown in Point XI of this brief, 
substantial credible evidence supporting appellants• 
convictions was introduced at trial. Thus, the trial court 
properly denied the motion to dismiss. 
Appellants' claim respecting the trial court's 
denial of their motion to arrest judgment is equally 
unmeritorious. Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
which provides in pertinent part: 
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At any time prior to the imposition of 
sentence, the court upon its own 
initiative may, or upon motion of a 
defendant shall, arrest judgment if the 
facts proveCl or admitted do not constitute 
a public offense, or the defendant is 
mentally ill, or there is other good cause 
for the arrest of judgment.4 
Appellants simply did not satisfy the requirements of this 
rule (see their motion at R. 145-146). 
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying appellants' motion for a new trial. 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,5 provides in 
pertinent part: 
The court may, upon motion of a party or 
upon its own---rriitiative, grant a new trial 
in the interest of justice if there is any 
error or impropriety which had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the rights 
of a party. [Emphasis added. J 
Appellants' motion for a new trial (see R. 161-162) failed to 
establish any error or impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse effect upon their rights. The errors they alleged in 
that motion have been addressed and disposed of as meritless 
in this brief. 
4 Utah Code Ann. 77-35-23 (1953) 
5 Utah Code Ann. 77-35-24 (1953) 
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POINT XI 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
APPELLANTS' CONVICTIONS. 
The standard for appellate review of an 
insufficiency of evidence claim is stated in State v. Petree, 
Utah, 659 P.2d 443 (1983): 
We review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the verdict of 
the jury. We reverse a jury conviction 
for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. 
Id. at 444. See also State v. Kereckes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161, 
1168 (1980); State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P,2d 229, 231 (1980). 
The evidence against appellants regarding their victimization 
of Virginia Lairby is as follows. Virginia Lairby repeatedly 
testified that on Easter 1981 her "privates" had been 
penetrated by a fork wielded by Mildred Lairby in the bathroom 
of Mildred and Timothy Lairby' s home. On both direct and 
cross-examination, Virginia asserted that she had not 
fabricated the incident or been told what to say by another 
(R. 52, 54, 66, 67, 106, 110, 118, 138, 168). Although he was 
unable to categorically state that moslestation had occured, a 
physician who examined Virginia shortly after the incident 
testified that he observed redness around the mucous membrane 
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of her vagina (R. 124). This evioence is sufficient to 
support appellant Mildreo Lairby's conviction of forcible 
sexual abuse under Utah Code Ann. -. 76-5-404 ( 1953), as 
amended, which at the time she was charged read in pertinent 
part: 
A person commits forcible sexual abuse 
if, under circumstances not amounting to 
rape or sodomy, or attempted rape or 
sodomy, he touches the anus or any part of 
the genitals of another or otherwise takes 
indecent liberties with another, ••• , 
with intent to cause substantial emotional 
or bodily pain to any person or with the 
intent to arouse or gratify the sexual 
desire of any person, without the consent 
of the other. 
The intent required by that statute could properly be inferred 
by the jury from the actions of appellant. See State v. 
Murphy, Utah, P.2d , Slip Opin. No. 18814 at p.4, filed 
October 31, 1983. 
Appellant Timothy Lairby's conviction of rape and 
forcible sodomy is also amply justified in light of the 
evidence adduced at trial. He relies heavily on the 
assumption that in order for Virginia to have been raped, 
physical damage would have had to occur to her vaginal 
tissues. Appellant speculates as to the physiological 
consequences of the rape of a small child without any 
evidentiary basis for his conclusions. On direct and 
cross-examination, Virginia testified that she knew the shape 
aoo size of an adult male's penis by observing Timothy's (R. 
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158) and that Timothy's penis was hard and that it hurt when 
it touched inside her vagina (R. 161, 169, 205, 251, 268, 
274). Virginia also vividly described how Timothy's emission 
had "puked" all over her so that she had to wash it off 
herself (R. 265, 171). Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-407 (1953), as 
amended, states that "any sexual penetration" is sufficient 
for rape, and Virginia testified that she was certain 
Timothy's penis had touched inside her vagina (R. 161, 205). 
Virginia al so told of a not her time when Timothy "sucked" her 
privates in the bathroom of his residence (R. 177). Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-5-403 (1953), as amended, defines first degree 
forcible sodomy as a sexual act involving the genitals of one 
person am the mouth or anus of another person under the age 
of 14, without the other's consent. Again, there is clear and 
undisputed evidence based on Virginia's testimony that Timothy 
made oral contact with her genitals, obviously without her 
consent. 
Futhermore, the evidence was sufficient to support 
appellant Timothy Lairby's conviction for the forcible sexual 
abuse of his step-daughter, Carri Lang. Carri testified that 
on approximately March 22, 1981, appellant laid her on a bed, 
pulled down her pants and fondled her genitals (R. 474-479). 
This uncontradicted evidence could easily support the jury's 
conclusion that appellant was guilty of forcible sexual abuse 
under Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-404 (1953), as amended. Again, 
the jury could properly infer the intent required by that 
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statute fran appellant's actions. See State v. Murphy. 
In conclusion, an appellate court will only overturn 
a verdict challenged on insufficieny of the evidence "when the 
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable man 
could not possibly have reached a vercl ict beyond a reasonable 
doubt." State v. Mccardle, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (1982). 
It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the 
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence; 
that an appellate court might view the evidence as less than 
wholly conclusive is not sufficient to overturn a verdict on 
appeal. State v. Howell, Utah, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (1982). 
Because the evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, was not sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that the jury must have 
entertained a reasonable cloubt that appellants were guilty of 
the crimes with which they were charged, appellants' 
insufficiency of evidence claim should be rejected and their 
convictionsshould be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent has endeavored to respond to every point 
in appellants' pro se brief that it believes merits a 
response. Based upon the foregoing, the judgments and 
sentences of the trial court should be affirmed. 
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1984. 
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